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The Safe Roads Act: The Constitutionality of the Roadblock
and Chemical Test Affidavit Sections
In 1983 the North Carolina General Assembly passed the Safe Roads
Act.' Enacted in response to the growing public concern over drinking and
driving, the Act brings about many changes in the state's driving-while-intoxi-
cated (DWI) laws. This note examines the constitutionality of section 22 of
the Act,2 which authorizes the use of roadblocks as an enforcement tool
against drunken driving, and section 26 of the Act,3 which governs procedure
for chemical testing for intoxication and the use of test results at trial. The
note concludes that the roadblock provision has minor constitutional flaws
that can be remedied easily, and that the chemical testing statute, while raising
more serious constitutional issues, probably will also withstand constitutional
attack.
Section 22 of the Act4 authorizes law enforcement agencies to conduct
impaired driving checks (better known as roadblocks) to enforce the DWI
laws. While many states have resorted to the roadblock as a method of de-
tecting DWI offenders, 5 North Carolina is the first state to enact a law ex-
pressly sanctioning the use of this technique. The law establishes three
prerequisites for a valid DWI check. First, the police must develop a "system-
atic plan in advance that takes into account the likelihood of detecting im-
paired drivers, traffic conditions, number of vehicles to be stopped, and the
convenience of the motoring public. ' '6 Second, the police must designate in
advance "the pattern both for stopping vehicles and for requesting drivers that
are stopped to submit to alcohol screening tests."'7 Contingency plans may be
developed that permit deviation from the pattern upon the occurrence of spec-
ified conditions, but no individual officer may be given discretion regarding
which vehicle is stopped or which driver is subjected to an alcohol screening
test.8 Finally, the police must mark "the area in which checks are conducted
to advise the public that an authorized impaired driving check is being
made."9
Any roadblock stop made pursuant to section 20-16.3A is a "seizure"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitu-
1. Safe Roads Act of 1983, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 435.
2. Id § 22 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A (1983)).
3. Id § 26 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1 (1983)).
4. Id § 22 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A (1983)).
5. See Note, Curbing the Drunk Driver Under the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Roadblock Seizures, 71 GEo. LJ. 1457, 1460 n.16 (1983).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(1) (1983).
7. Id § 20-16.3A(2).
8. Id Notwithstanding the limits placed on the exercise of discretion by individual officers,
the section also provides that any officer may request a screening test of a driver if he has in-
dependent adequate grounds under the general preliminary test statute, id § 20-16.3.
9. Id § 20-16.3A(3).
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tion.10 The fourth amendment11 protects citizens against searches and
seizures that are unreasonable; therefore, the North Carolina statute must sat-
isfy a fourth amendment analysis to be constitutional.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Delaware v. Prouse 12 pro-
vides the proper framework for analyzing the constitutionality of North Caro-
lina's roadblock statute. In Prouse the Court considered the constitutionality
of Delaware's practice of randomly stopping motorists for license and registra-
tion checks. The Court stated that the "the permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental
interests."13 Applying this test, the Court held that the intrusiveness of the
stop outweighed the state's interest in promoting safety on its roads. In strik-
ing down the Delaware practice, the Court relied heavily on its prior decision
in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.14 In that case the Court had considered
the constitutionality of roving border patrols that stopped cars at random to
search for evidence of illegal aliens. The Court held that the intrusiveness of
the stop, which created substantial anxiety for the detained motorist, interfered
with his freedom of movement, presented the opportunity for abuse of discre-
tion by individual officers, and outweighed the strong state interest in policing
the border.15 The Court held that such an intrusion could be justified only by
a showing of reasonable suspicion.16 The Prouse Court found Delaware's
practice equally intrusive, and further questioned whether randomly stopping
cars advanced the state's safety interest any more than did the more conven-
tional practice of stopping cars based on observed violations. 17 Finally, noting
that the same potential for abuse of discretion was present in Prouse as in
Brignoni-Ponce, the Court held Delaware's practice unconstitutional in the ab-
sence of some reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver in question
should be stopped.' 8
Despite holding Delaware's practice unconstitutional, the Court implied
in dicta that a checkpoint stop at which all oncoming traffic was questioned
would be constitutional even without reasonable suspicion.19 This conclusion
10. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV
12. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
13. Id at 654 (footnote omitted). Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (warrantless "stop and
frisk" for weapons constitutional if based on reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity).
Reasonable suspicion permits the officer to make a brief investigatory stop, but a full search or
seizure is unconstitutional unless based upon probable cause, which requires a higher quantum of
proof.
14. 422 U.S. 873 (1975)..
15. Id at 882, 884.
16. Id
17. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657-60.
18. Id at 661, 663.
19. See id at 663. Justice Blackmun suggested that a nonrandom stop at which less than
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was based on the Court's prior holding in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.20
In that case a permanent border checkpoint at which all motorists on an inter-
state highway were required to slow for inspection for signs of illegal aliens
was upheld as constitutional. The permanent checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte
was distinguished from the roving patrols disapproved of in Brignoni-Ponce
because it involved a lesser degree of intrusion and a lesser risk of officer abuse
of discretion.21 A roadblock at which all cars are stopped briefly would be
more akin to the permanent stop upheld in Martinez-Fuerte than to the discre-
tionary stop disapproved in Brignoni-Ponce. Thus, such a roadblock would be
constitutional even if conducted without reasonable suspicion.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet considered a case specifically
involving a DWI roadblock, the Court would apply a test similar to that used
in Prouse. Lower courts considering the constitutionality of roadblocks for
drunken-drivers have applied the Prouse test, weighing the intrusiveness of the
stop in question against the state interest advanced by the police practice. 22
Courts generally have upheld stops that conformed with the procedure sug-
gested in the Prouse dicta, emphasizing the lesser degree of intrusion involved
in such a stop and the important state interest in reducing the incidence of
drunken driving.23 For example, in State v. Coccomo 24 a New Jersey superior
court upheld a roadblock at which every fifth car was stopped for license and
registration checks, during the course of which the officer looked for signs of
intoxication.
Not all state DWI roadblocks have been upheld under the standards es-
tablished inProuse. Courts that have struck down DWI roadblocks have done
so primarily on three grounds: (1) too much discretion vested in the officers
conducting the roadblocks, due to the lack of specific directions or guidelines
1007o of the cars were stopped (for example, every tenth car) also would be constitutional. Id at
664 (Blackmun, J., concurring). This reasoning has been adopted by some state courts. See, e.g.,
State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980) (every fifth car stopped by police).
20. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
21. Id at 560. Because all motorists were required to slow, the subjective intrusiveness of the
stop was lesser than in Brignoni-Ponce. The checkpoint stop was not as unsettling to the motorist
as the individual stop by a roving border patrol. A final factor distinguishing Marlinez-Fuerle was
the presence of signs on the highway notifying motorists of the immigration checkpoint, thus
informing them that the stop was a valid exercise of the police power of the state and reducing the
level of anxiety generated by the stop.
22. See State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992 (1983);
Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983); State v. Coccomo, 177
N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980); see also State v. Cline (unreported Maryland trial court
opinion), discussed in Note, supra note 5, at 1471.
23. The Supreme Court recently has acknowledged the national importance of the drunken
driving problem. See South Dakota v. Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916, 920 (1983) ("The carnage caused by
drunk drivers is well documented and needs no detailed recitation."). In Neville the Supreme
Court held that the introduction into evidence of a defendant's refusal to submit to chemical
testing did not violate defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. The Court
reasoned that the privilege did not attach to the refusal because the refusal had not been "co-
erced." The North Carolina Court of Appeals has reached the same conclusion, though by differ-
ent reasoning, regarding N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(f) (1983), which expressly provides that
defendant's refusal to submit to testing shall be admissible in a criminal proceeding against him.
See State v. Flannery, 31 N.C. App. 617, 230 S.E.2d 603 (1976) (physical test results not "testimo-
nial" in nature and thus not within scope of fifth amendment).
24. 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980).
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from higher authorities on the exact procedure to be followed;25 (2) inade-
quate notice to drivers that they were being stopped pursuant to a valid DWI
roadblock;26 and (3) lack of proof that the roadblock technique is any more
effective in detecting drunk drivers than the routine practice of stopping cars
based on observed driving irregularities.27 Applying the balancing test of
Prouse, these courts have found that the state interest promoted by the stop-
ping of motorists was insufficient to justify the intrusiveness of the roadblocks
in question.
Although North Carolina's new roadblock statute has constitutional
problems of its own, it avoids these potential problems.2 8 The problem of lack
of specific guidelines from higher authorities is avoided by the requirement
that the law enforcement agency develop a "systematic plan in advance" for
conducting an impaired driving check. 29 Officer discretion regarding which
cars are stopped is limited by the provision requiring designation in advance
of the pattern both for stopping vehicles and for requesting alcohol screening
tests.30 The problem of inadequate notice to drivers about the reason for the
stop is avoided by section 20-16.3A(3), which requires that the area in which
cars are being stopped be marked to notify the public that a statutory impaired
driving check is being conducted.3 1 If the procedure established by the new
statute is followed by the police, the practice almost surely will withstand the
constitutional challenges that have invalidated other roadblocks.
While North Carolina's statute avoids the problems presented by prior
roadblocks, it may be subject to constitutional challenge on other grounds.
The legislature properly was concerned with unbridled officer discretion, and
thus required that the roadblocks be conducted according to a predetermined
pattern.3 2 The statute fails, however, to delineate the procedures that may be
employed once a vehicle has been stopped.33 It speaks of "the pattern both for
stopping vehicles and for requesting drivers. . . to submit to alcohol screen-
ing tests."'34 This use of the word "pattern" suggests that the North Carolina
25. See State ex rel Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 4-5, 663 P.2d 992, 996
(1983); Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983).
26. See State ex rel Ekstrom v. Justice Court of Ariz., 136 Ariz. 1, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996
(1983).
27. Id at 5, 663 P.2d at 996. The State argued that despite the intrusiveness of the road-
blocks, the procedure was justified by the state's strong interest in apprehending drunk drivers.
The court acknowledged that interest, but questioned whether the roadblock technique advanced
the state interest any more than did less intrusive procedures.
28. The statute was drafted carefully. It is essentially a codification of constitutional law
precedent in the roadblock field.
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(l) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 6.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(2) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 7.
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(3) (1983). See supra text accompanying note 9.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3A(2) (1983).
33. The term "impaired driving check" is used as a term of art in the statute, yet it is not
defined in the definitional section of the motor vehicle chapter, id § 20-4.01. Section 20-16.3A
states that it does not limit "the authority of a law enforcement officer or agency to conduct a
license check independently or in conjunction with the impaired driving check." The language
implies that the "impaired driving check" is something more than just a license check, though the
exact extent of the stop contemplated by the legislature is unclear.
34. Id § 20-16.3A(2) (emphasis added).
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statute would permit a scheme whereby drivers, once stopped, are required to
submit to sobriety tests according to a pattern. For instance, every car is
stopped for a routine check and every tenth driver is required to submit to an
alcohol screening test. The fact that the roadblock statute authorizes the po-
lice to require a driver to submit to an alcohol screening test based on a ran-
dom pattern rather than on reasonable suspicion gives rise to the best
constitutional challenge to the statute.
The constitutionality of a police practice must be determined by weighing
its intrusiveness against the state interest it advances. Even if a stop involves
no officer discretion, it still may be unconstitutional because it intrudes too
greatly on an individual's privacy. Most roadblocks consist of a brief stop,
during which the motorist is required to produce his license and registration
while the officer looks for signs of intoxication. 35 The stop is only minimally
intrusive, and thus is constitutional. More intrusive subsequent measures,
such as roadside sobriety tests, may be permissible, but generally only upon
reasonable and articulable suspicion as described in Prouse.3 6 The language
of section 20-16.3A suggests, however, that alcohol screening tests could be
administered even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Under the Supreme
Court's balancing tests developed in Prouse and the border search cases, re-
quiring a driver to submit to further tests, if based neither on probable cause
nor reasonable suspicion, is unconstitutional.37 Subjecting a motorist to ex-
tended roadside testing entails a much greater intrusion, both in time delay
and invasion of privacy, into the individual's fourth amendment rights than
does the usual license and registration check. Such an extensive intrusion
should be permitted only if based on reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
driver is intoxicated. 38
35. See Note, supra note 5, at 1463.
36. See, e.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980). In Coccorno de-
fendant was stopped according to a policy of stopping every fifth vehicle. Defendant was asked to
produce his license, registration, and insurance card. When the officer noticed that defendant had
bloodshot eyes and alcohol on his breath, he requested defendant to get out of the car. Defendant
failed two roadside sobriety tests and was arrested. The officer's inital observations concerning
defendant's breath and eyes provided reasonable suspicion to justify the further tests.
37. A stop requiring a motorist to submit to an alcohol screening test is a far greater intrusion
than the warrantless and suspicionless stops authorized by the Supreme Court in Martinez.Fuerte
and Prouse. In Martinez-Fuerte the average length of the stop, even for those referred to the
secondary inspection area, was 3 to 5 minutes, and inquiry was limited to questioning about citi-
zenship and immigration status. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 546. The detention implicitly ap-
proved by dicta inProuse similarly was limited both in duration and scope of inquiry. Prouse, 440
U.S. at 663. Neither case can be read as approving a warrantless and suspicionless intrusion as
extensive as a roadside sobriety test. Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3(a)(1) (1983), preliminary
testing may be performed upon a reasonable belief that the driver has consumed alcohol and has
committed a moving violation. The same "reasonable belief' standard also should apply to road-
side tests administered in the context of an impaired driving check.
38. See Note, supra note 5, at 1485-86 (arguing that "articulable suspicion" should be re-
quired before extended DWI investigation may be performed). The commentator argues that
imposing such a requirement does not hinder the advancement of the state's interest in appre-
hending drunk drivers. A recent case, People v. Carlson, 52 U.S.L.W. 2465 (Colo. Feb. 28, 1984),
imposed an even higher standard, requiring that probable cause be found before roadside sobriety
tests may be performed. Probable cause requires a higher quantum of proof than reasonable,
articulable suspicion. See supra note 13.
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This potential constitutional problem could be remedied by a short
amendment to the statute. The legislature need only add a statement that al-
cohol screening tests may not be administered according to a pattern, but must
be based on reasonable suspicion.39 Such a clarification would limit police
inquiry at a roadblock to license and registration checks, clearly within the
constitutional limits set by the Supreme Court in Prouse.
Section 26 of the Act40 deals with chemical analysis for intoxication and
admissibility of chemical test results. This section also raises important consti-
tutional questions. Of particular significance is North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 20-139.1(el), 4 I which allows admission of an affidavit certifying
blood alcohol test results without requiring the analyst who performed the test
to appear in court and testify. The analyst still may be required to appear, but
only if subpoenaed by the defendant.42 The results of blood alcohol concen-
tration (BAC) tests are of great importance in any DWI proceeding, 43 and the
new law exempting the chemical analyst from testifying raises serious ques-
tions about the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to confront the
witnesses against him.44
39. Alternatively, the statute could be amended to provide that alcohol screening tests may
be administered only in accordance with the requirements of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.3 (1983),
the general preliminary test statute. See supra note 37. The problem also could be remedied by a
judicial reading of the "pattern" for requiring drivers to submit to screening tests to mean that
further testing may only be required if certain predetermined factors indicating possible intoxica-
tion are present. Such an interpretation would be a strained reading of the statutory language,
however, and an amendment expressly establishing a reasonable suspicion standard would be
preferable.
40. Safe Roads Act of 1983, 1983 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 435 § 26 (codified at N.C. GEN
STAT. § 20-139.1 (1983)). Section 26 of the Act rewrote the old § 20-139.1, adding new subsections
while changing some language in the sections already in existence.
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(el) (1983).
42. Id
43. Although results of BAC tests in some states give rise to specified presumptions regarding
defendant's guilt or innocence, see, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1005 (1982), North Carolina makes
driving with a BAC of .10% or greater a separate offense. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2)
(1983). The new law also allows for a 10 day pretrial license revocation if defendant has a BAC of
.10% or more within a relevant time after driving. See id § 20-16.5(b)(4)(a). Given the potential
ramifications of an unfavorable test, the results of chemical analysis are of utmost importance to
defendant.
The criminalization of a. 10% blood alcohol level is another aspect of the drunk driving law
that may be subject to constitutional attack. Although the statute has been upheld against an
arbitrariness challenge as a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state, see State v.
Basinger, 30 N.C. App. 45, 226 S.E.2d 216 (1976), one commentator has suggested that such stat-
utes may be unconstitutionally vague. See Thompson, The Constitutionality of Chemical Test Pre-
sumptions of Intoxication in Motor Vehicle Statutes, 20 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 301, 335 (1983). The
premise of this argument is that the driver has no way of knowing his precise BAC, and thus
cannot conform his behavior to the statutory norm. While North Carolina courts have not yet
addressed this argument, the courts of other states have rejected it. See Roberts v. State, 329 So.
2d 296 (Fla. 1976); Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974). Given the increasing public con-
cern over drunken driving, it is unlikely that a North Carolina court would invalidate so integral a
provision of the statute.
44. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him. ... U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The
confrontation clause is applicable to the states by incorporation into the due process requirements
of the fourteenth amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The North Carolina
Constitution has a provision analogous to the sixth amendment. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 23.
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The constitutional issue raised by the new version of section 20-139.1 is
best understood by comparing it to its predecessor. Under the prior statutory
scheme, the validity of a chemical analysis hinged on whether it had been
performed in compliance with the requirements of the State Commission for
Health Services, and whether it had been performed by a person possessing a
valid permit issued by the Department of Human Resources.45 Any failure to
comply with these requirements rendered the test inadmissible, and the State
had the burden of proving the validity of the chemical analysis.46 For in-
stance, in State v. Gray47 the North Carolina Court of Appeals found prejudi-
cial error in the state's failure to "lay the foundation" for the introduction of
breathalyzer test results and granted defendant a new trial.48
The new section 20-139.1 preserves the valid procedure and valid permit
requirements, and adds a further admissibility requirement that the instru-
ment used to measure defendant's BAC must have had an up-to-date preven-
tive maintenance record, according to regulations prescribed by the
Commission for Health Services. 49 The important change is in the procedure
for introducing the test results into evidence. Section 20-139.1(el) provides
that a properly executed affidavit of a chemical analyst is admissible, without
further authentication, as evidence of: (1) defendant's blood alcohol level, (2)
the time of the sample, (3) the type of analysis administered and procedure
followed, (4) the type and status of the analyst's permit, and (5) the preventive
maintenance record of the breath-testing instrument, if that is the method
used, as reflected by its maintenance records.50 This amendment obviates the
need for any foundation-laying by the State, provided the analyst has executed
a proper, sworn statement, because such a statement is automatically
admissible.
An argument may be made that the admission into evidence of the chemi-
cal analyst's affidavit, without his live testimony, violates a defendant's sixth
amendment right to confrontation. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
held that the admission into evidence of a death certificate containing a hear-
say and conclusory statement about a victim's cause of death violates an ac-
cused's right to confront the witnesses against him.5' If the analyst's affidavit
is analogized to the death certificate, it follows that admission of the affidavit
45. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(b) (1983) (substantially preserving requirements of pred-
ecessor section). The requirements apply to testing of both breath and blood samples.
46. See State v. Powell, 279 N.C. 608, 184 S.E.2d 243 (1971); State v. Gray, 28 N.C. App. 506,
221 S.E.2d 765 (1976); State v. Warf, 16 N.C. App. 431, 192 S.E.2d 37 (1972); State v. Caviness, 7
N.C. App. 541, 173 S.E.2d 12 (1970).
47. 28 N.C. App. 506, 221 S.E.2d 765 (1976).
48. Id at 507, 221 S.E.2d at 766.
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-139.1(b2) (1983). The burden is on the defendant both to object to
the evidence and to demonstrate that the required preventive maintenance procedures had not
been performed.
50. Id § 20-139.1(el). The analyst is not required to swear to an affidavit, but may choose to
do so for his own convenience. The analyst is required to record defendant's alcohol concentra-
tion and the time of collection of the sample, and to furnish a copy of this record to defendant or
his attorney. See id § 20-139.1(e).
51. See State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 188 S.E.2d 289 (1972).
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also is unconstitutional. The supreme court has indicated that the admission
of chemical test results to prove the identity of a drug in a drug prosecution
does not violate the right to confront.5 2 This case, however, is distinguishable.
The identity of a drug in a drug prosecution is seldom the ultimate issue in the
case; more often the circumstances surrounding defendant's connection with
the drug are being disputed. By contrast, in a DWI proceeding defendant's
blood alcohol content is often the dispositive issue in the case, for a blood-
alcohol level of .10 percent is a per se criminal violation in North Carolina.53
Thus, it may be argued that convenience to the State, in not having to produce
the chemical analyst, is outweighed by defendant's overriding interest in ex-
amining the analyst, whose report may be dispositive on the question of de-
fendant's guilt or innocence, and that admission without the appearance of the
analyst is unconstitutional.
Although this argument is persuasive, it overlooks the statute's provision
that defendant may require the analyst to appear at trial by subpoenaing him
as an adverse witness. 54 This provision would seem to satisfy the constitu-
tional confrontation requirement, but two plausible arguments can be made
that it does not. First, it may be unconstitutional to shift to defendant the
burden of producing the analyst.55 Second, the opportunity for direct exami-
nation as an adverse witness may be an inadequate substitute for cross-exami-
nation. The Supreme Court has recognized that cross-examination is an
essential element of the sixth amendment's safeguards.5 6 On conventional
cross-examination defendant's counsel may impeach the testimony of the wit-
ness based on the statements he has made on direct, but this type of impeach-
ment is not possible when the witness is subject only to direct examination,
even as an adverse witness. Thus, it may be argued that giving a defendant
the right to subpoena a chemical analyst under section 20-139.1(el) is insuffi-
cient to guarantee an accused his constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him.
The best argument in favor of the statute's constitutionality is that de-
fendant's sixth amendment rights are protected by his right to a new trial at
the superior court level if he is convicted in district court.5 7 Section 20-
139.1(el) provides that the analyst's affidavit is admissible without authentica-
tion in district court proceedings; therefore, the analyst would have to appear
at trial in superior court. The right to a new trial guarantees the defendant an
52. See In re Arthur, 291 N.C. 640, 231 S.E.2d 614 (1977).
53. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(a)(2) (1983).
54. See supra text accompanying note 42.
55. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires the state to prove a criminal defendant's guilt be-
ond a reasonable doubt. Because the chemical analyst is so important to the state's case, it may
e argued that shifting to defendant the burden of producing this witness is unconstitutional under
the general principles enunciated in Winshop. See e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 487
(1895) (burden of proof on the prosecution to prove defendant's guilt applies to every necessary
element of offense).
56. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
57. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1431(b) (1983).
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opportunity to cross-examine the analyst. It may be argued that the added
time and expense required for a new trial in superior court place an unconsti-
tutional burden on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights, but the
Supreme Court has rejected this contention with regard to the criminal de-
fendant's right to trial by jury.58 Unless a court were to draw a distinction
between the constitutional right to confront witnesses and the constitutional
right to a trial by jury in a criminal case, an argument in favor of the statute
based on the defendant's right to a new trial probably will be sufficient to
overcome a sixth amendment challenge to the statute.
Precedent from other states also suggests that the statute is constitutional.
The Virginia Code provides that when a blood sample is tested for alcohol
content a certificate is to be executed stating the procedure and results of the
test.59 The certificate, when duly attested, is deemed admissible in any civil or
criminal proceeding as evidence of the facts stated therein.60 In Kay v. United
States61 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered
a sixth amendment challenge to a prior version of the Virginia statute. The
court upheld the constitutionality of the statute, stating that the sixth amend-
ment was not intended "to serve as a rigid and inflexible barrier against the
orderly development of reasonable and necessary exceptions to the hearsay
rule." 62 The court further emphasized that the receipt of the certificate into
evidence did not foreclose inquiry into the conduct of the test, but that such
inquiries went to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility.63
The certificate held constitutional in Kay is analogous to the affidavit exe-
cuted by the chemical analyst under section 20-139.1(el). The Kay decision,
although not binding on North Carolina courts, is highly persuasive. It is un-
likely that a North Carolina court would hold the provision unconstitutional
in light of the decision in Kay. Kay may be distinguishable on the ground that
Virginia's statute did not criminalize a .10 percent BAC, while North Caro-
lina's DWI law does, and thus defendant's interest in cross-examining the ana-
lyst is greater in North Carolina. Although this distinction might lessen the
importance a North Carolina court would give to the Kay holding, the case
probably still would be given substantial weight. Taken together, an argument
based on defendant's right to subpoena the analyst, his right to a new trial in
superior court at which the analyst must appear, and the practice in other
states as represented by Kay with respect to admission of blood test results in
DWI cases, would be sufficient to uphold section 20-139.1 (el) against constitu-
tional attack.
In conclusion, both statutes suffer from some constitutional defects. Sec-
tion 20-16.3A (section 22 of the Safe Roads Act) seems to authorize an uncon-
58. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 626 (1976).
59. See VA. CODE § 18.2-268(e) (Supp. 1983).
60. Id § 18.2-268(f). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-717.2 (Supp. 1983); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-306 (1984).
61. 255 F.2d 476 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 825 (1958).
62. Id at 480.
63. Id
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stitutional intrusion into fourth amendment rights, but this problem can be
eliminated by a short amendment without upsetting the basic thrust of the
roadblock statute. Section 20-139.1(el) (section 26 of the Safe Roads Act) on
its face seems to deprive a defendant of his sixth amendment right to confront
the witnesses against him. Other statutory provisions, however, such as the
right to a new trial in a higher court at which the chemical analyst must ap-
pear, are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the sixth amendment.
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